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A Public Choice Approach to Transboundary Acid Deposition 
Introduction 
If one defines public choice as the ag~regation of individual prefer-
ences to maximize a social welfare function, public choice theories come to 
play in the presence of a market imperfection. It was a collective deci-
sion which created the market mechanism; we rely on implicit social choice 
to sustain its existence; thus, it is reasonable to presume that a collec-
tive action may be required to correct the imperfection. Mueller {1976] 
points out that the work on public choice in the presence of market failure 
centers on establishing the conditions for an efficient allocation of re-
sources once an imperfection has been identified. Rardin [1982] introduces 
the problems of public choice when dealing with the pollution externality 
by labeling the idea as logically impeccable, yet seemingly specious. 
This paper focuses on the interaction of individual actors in arriving 
at a solution to the transboundary-transported air pollution problem. First, 
a brief discussion is provided on the problem of transported air pollution 
and the familiar theoretical solutions to such a phenomenon. Then, the com-
plexities introduced by trans-boundary pollution are presented, followed by 
a discussion of how this dilemma can be addressed through collective action. 
The paper concludes with a suggested research agenda. 
The Problem of Transported Air Pollution 
The transported pollution presently receiving the most attention is 
acid precipitation. It has become a political as well as scientific issue 
in many areas of the world. This phenomenon is the source of tension be-
tween Great Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia; between China and Korea; 
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between the United States and Canada; and even between different regions of 
the United States. All of this has increased the public awareness of the 
problem and the call for some type of political action. The main concern 
about acid rain is the cumlative ecosystem and structural damage it causes 
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Structures and Buildin~s 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that as much as 
50 percent of total global SO emissions come from economic activities 
X 
including 14 percent from petroleum refining, 16 percent from burning 
petroleum products, and 70 percent from coal combustion.!/ 
With any technological external diseconomyt/, the true cost ot produc-
ing the good or service is shared by (imposed on) entities outside the mar-
ket for that good. The price of electricity in one region is lower than 
its true economic cost because part of the cost is borne by members of 
another region. Externalities of this type create an imperfection in the 
market, or a divergence between private and social costs and benefits. 
This results in a misallocation of resources from an economic efficiency 
standpoint. The methods employed to correct this imperfection will vary, 
depending on the circumstances encountered. 
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Simple Theoretical Solution 
Consider a source-receptor situation where the source is a fertilizer 
processing plant and the receptor is a neighborhood of 15 residential homes 
downwind. The location of this plant imposes a cost on the neighborhood 
residents by degrading the quality of the air. Since the price paid by the 
fertilizer customers does not reflect the cost imposed on the neighborhood, 
the conditions for social efficiency are violated by the economic activi-
ties of various entities [Mills, 1978]. In this case, it is possible to 
make some people better off without making anyone worse off, i.e., it is 
not a Parente optimal allocation of resources. Therefore, those who stand 
to gain from a correction in this situation have the incentive to seek each 
other and negotiate a collectively advantageous agreement. The neighborhood 
may form an association designed to confront the fertilizer plant, seek-
ing a resolution of the problem. 
If we let D represent the total annual damages to the receptors and C 
be the cost of abatement, a situation where D > C would indicate that a 
mutually advantageous agreement could be reached. Several possible solu-
tions are outlined by Bromley [1978] in his discussion of alternative rules 
of entitlements. The association would be willing to pay the fertilizer 
plant an amount between C and D to entice the abatement of pollution. Or, 
conversely, the association would be willing to allow the plant to continue 
its pollution if it paid them an amount greater than or equal to D. In 
each case, property rights are not explicitly assigned, yet one or the other 
is protected by a liability rule (a right to compensation). The two senar-
ios would probably not result in the same allocation of resources, as the 
incomes or profits of each party would be affected by the outcome. In 
essence, the decision reached through private negotiation regards the assign-
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ment of entitlements. In the first solution, the firm apparently had the 
right to pollute and could be stopped only through compensation. In the 
other case, the association had the right to clean air which could be vio-
lated if they are recompensed. 
As simple and intuitively pleasing as this example is, market ineffi-
ciencies caused by pollution are normally not corrected in such a manner. 
This is true for two reasons: (1) transaction costs, and (2) the public 
good nature of pollution abatement. 
First, transaction costs include the costs of congregating the recep-
tors, locating the sources, and negotiating a mutually agreeable exchange 
[Mills, 1978]. When speaking of a small neighborhood of receptors affected 
by one source, the chances are good that the individuals could successfully 
gather to confront the problem in a manner similar to what was presented 
above. However, when we consider a large number of geographically and 
politically separated receptors affected by a large number of geographically 
separated sources, the problem of collecting individuals becomes more complex; 
and, the costs involved to congregate these individuals for the purpose 
of reaching a decision may prove prohibitive. 
In order to fully understand the foregoing, consider the response 
function cited in Mueller, R = BP + d - c, where BP represents the per-
ceived benefit to society from an individual action (B) multiplied by the 
perceived probability that this individual action will have an effect on 
the outcome (P); and d - c represents the individual's private benefit 
minus th<.' pr ivatl~ cost of nc tion. For a smnll group, BP mny dominntc the 
decision of the individual since it is perceived that an extra person will 
make a big difference in the outcome with a high probability. As the size 
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of the group increases, the perceived group benefit of an individual's 
action is reduced, as is the perception of P. At this point the d - c com-
ponents dominate, and the individual responds based on private net bene-
fit. Buchanan and Tullock [1969] show how the individual costs of decision 
making increase with group size. Assuming this is the case, the individuals 
will soon find such action resulting in a negative net benefit, which will 
result in nonparticipation. It follows that the costs of securing agreement, 
within a decisionmaking group, increase as the size of the group increases 
[Buchanan and Tullock]. At some point, the "transactions cost" of gathering 
the receptors to make a collective decision is greater than the benefits de-
rived. This is especially true when dealing with multiple sources as well 
as a large number of receptors. 
Next, consider the public good characteristics of pollution abatement. 
Remember that a pure public good satisfies three conditions: (1) absence 
of rivalry among beneficiaries, (2) it is not possible and/or feasible to 
exclude one beneficiary, and (3) adding one beneficiary carries zero mar-
ginal cost. Once a pollution abatement program has been implemented, ex-
cluding one beneficiary is not possible. Also, consumption or enjoyment of 
this good by one individual does not preclude or decrease the enjoyment by 
others; and, adding one more beneficiary adds nothing to the total cost of 
the control program. The public good nature of pollution abatement circum-
vents private negotiation through the phenomenon of the free rider. Because 
we are dealing with a public good, all receptors will benefit from the 
abatement program, regardless of whether they contribute. If total societal 
benefits equal D, contributions may sum to D - D/N in the presence of one 
free rider. Consequently, even though D is greater than C, the pollution 
abatement program would not function properly. 
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Due to the problems discussed above it may be concluded that pollution 
abatement cannot be adequately handled through private negotiation. Since 
it may be characterized as a public good, it requires policymaking and 
implementation via some collective action or government process. 
The Transboundary Problem 
Consider the situation where the source-receptor relationship spans 
two geographic regions or political jurisdictions, the typical case with 
transported pollution. This means that the consumption of individuals in 
one rt..'gion impost's spillover efferts on individuals in another ;urisdiction. 
Even though the source and receptor are geographically separated, the pollu-
tion still results in a social inefficiency. However, it is difficult for 
the residents of the source region to realize the need for corrective action, 
or for the residents of the receptor region to realize either source reduc-
tions or compensation for damage. 
The source and receptor will not arrive at a solution through private 
negotiation for the reasons stated earlier. Thus, some type of collective 
action is required if progress is to be made. National governments have 
administrative, legislative, and judicial mechanisms for "internalizing" 
actions whose effects cross regional or state boundaries; but, what about 
economic activities whose effects transcend national boundaries? 
Mills writes of caring for the "global environment" where our account-
ing stance changes to confront the resource allocation problem from a world-
wide perspective. However, Frey [1984] points out, in international poli-
tics, even when the actors fully perceive that it is advantageous for them 
to coop0ratc in the provision of n public good, it is difficult and some-
times even impossible to coordinate joint action. Some type of constitu-
tional contract may be arranged between the independent national actors; 
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however~ cooperation cannot be guaranteed unless the actors believe that 
obeying the rules will be mutually advantageous. 
In addition, the contractual relationship should involve as fev1 member 
nations as possible. Empirical studies have shown small state, regional, 
or international organizations to be more successful at achieving their 
objectives than their larger counterparts [Russell, 1971]. This is because 
each nation sees its additional cost of contribution risin~ steeply as the 
organization grows in size and activity. In addition, the perceived mar-
ginal benefit declines with growth, and the individual actor finds it in-
creasingly difficult to take interest and devote effort. This observed 
phenomenon can be explained by the response function discussed earlier.l/ 
Thus, any contractual agreement designed to alleviate or compensate for 
trans-boundary acid deposition must involve a small number of nations who 
individually perceive it to be mutually advantageous to cooperate. 
Mutual Compensation Agreement 
A plan which incorporates the aforementioned features is the mutual 
compensation agreement presented by the OECD {1976] as a framework for solv-
ing the problems of trans-boundary pollution. It features acceptable char-
acteristics by the simple standards set out above; however~ it does not 
address all the difficulties inherent in a joint nation agreement. The 
framework assumes one way transported pollution where the source nation 
(source) and receptor nation (receptor) are able to agree that action is 
needed to resolve the situation. 
The mutual compensation rule requires the source to pay an emissions 
tax related to the cost of transboundary damages estimated by the receptor, 
while the receptor pays an abatement fee based on the cost of pollution 
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control as estimated by the source. In essence, this scheme induces the 
source to reduce its emissions and encourages the receptor to accept some 
of the residual costs. If the receptor requires more intensive abatement, 
it must compensate by paying a higher fee; likewise, the source can emit 
more pollutants only by paying more tax. The policies will be established 
and implemented by a joint agency consisting of representatives from each 
nation. The joint agency will determine the charges to the source and 
receptor as well as the appropriate compensation based on the information 
provided by each actor. 
The analysis begins \nth an estimation of the damages to the receptor 
from trans-boundary deposition, as estimated by the receptor:~/ 
D = oD(p) + d (1) 
which states that estimated damage is a function of the pollution level, p, 
the administrative cost of estimating the function, d, and an error term o. 
Likewise, the cost of abatement, as estimated by the source, is expressed af 
c = aC(p) + a (2) 
with a similar interpretation. The joint agency uses this information to 
determine the optimal level of emissions by minimizing the total amount col-
lected from the two nations, 
M = aC(p) + a + oD(p) + d; (3) 
then it determines the appropriate compensation for each actor. By mini-
mizing M and solving for first and second order conditions, it can be shown 
that the interaction of the source, receptor, and ioint agency will lead 
to an optimal level of pollution p*, and very accurate estimates of the 
damages and costs, i.e., 8 =a= 1.~/ 
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There are advantages and disadvantages to this framework. First, 
mutual compensation is based on economic theory and results in an efficient 
solution between the two actors, i.e., each nation desires the pollution 
where the tax paid reflects their marginal willingness to pay& However, 
although this principle leads to an efficient level of pollution, it does 
not result in an optimal resource allocation. To see this, apply the mutual 
compensation solution to the fertilizer plant example. The plant pays the 
association an amount D; the association pays the plant an amount C; and 
emissions are reduced. Assuming the pollution level P* is efficiently de-
termined, the price of fertilizer facing the consumer is unaffected. If 
the receptors are not the consumers of fertilizer, we continue to suffer a 
social inefficiency since the price still does not reflect the true cost. 
Another advantage of mutual compensation is that it discourages error 
or cheating on the part of either nation; and it provides a forum for the 
exchange of technical information which each party will provide to improve 
the administrative efficiency of the system. However, this system would 
be very costly to administer as well as police. 
Finally, mutual compensation provides a means of one-to-one negotia-
tion which is crucial for alleviation of the transboundary pollution pro-
blem. This assumes that encouraging negotiations are well underway with 
each party searching for some solution to the transboundary pollution pro-
blem. This is not always the case. As stated earlier, the source is not 
likely to see adequate reason to move from status quo if it can not be 
shown that doing so will improve its position. Although mutual compensa-
tion is an efficient method of handling the problem of trans-boundary exter-
nalities, it fails to address the situation where the benefits of entering 
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into such an agreement are strongly skewed toward one nation. Sampson 
[1982] states that if the present situation fails the test for international 
policy coordination, then there is a basis for adding and subtracting of 
issues to see if alternative situations place parties in a position to bargain. 
Issue Linkage and Transboundary Pollution 
Tollison and Willett [1979] developed the idea of using issue linkages 
as a means of paying compensation through positions taken in other negotia-
tions. They contend that linkage of issues is most likely to prove success-
ful where the benefits of negotiation are skewed in the direction of a few 
bargainers. Thus, issue linkage is a way to encourage discussions which 
may not otherwise occur due to distributional effects. The Tollison-Willett 
analysis is applied to the source-receptor transboundary pollution problem 
in the illustration below. This shows a graphical depiction of negotiations 















tures and assumed responsibility regarding two issues of continental inter-
est: potash imports and acid pollution abatement. Read the source's (S) 
indifference curve from the southwest corner and the receptor's (R) indiffer-
ence curve from the northeast corner. If the present state of affairs 
places the two countries at point C in their negotiations, one sees the 
source responsible for SX of potash imports and SP of pollution control. 
s s 
Movement along cd places both countries on higher indifference curves. At 
point d the source and receptor have exhausted all gains from agreement. 
Curve ef is the contract curve along which movement is possible only by 
superior bargaining of one or the other actor. For instance, point f places 
sat a much better position at the expense of R, i.e., zero sum exchange. 
As is illustrated in this example, the bargaining begins between S and 
R at a point where both can gain through informed negotiation. In this sit-
uation, the source would be willing to take a more active role in reducing 
air pollution if the receptor would reduce or not impose barriers to potash 
exports. Agreements such as this move them along cd to higher levels of 
total welfare. This implies that, for some cases, the best alternative is 
to find another area of possible exchange which has highly skewed benefits. 
Linking those issues would allow both parties to find advantages in negotia-
tions, thus an agreement would increase the welfare of all parties involved. 
In summary, this paper has delineated the collective good nature of 
acid deposition and has discussed two alternatives (mutual compensation and 
issue linkage) for handling same. This provides a framework for defining 
the proper accounting stance and getting estimates of economic social costs 
and benefits from varying levels of acid deposition. For example, under the 
mutual compensation agreement estimates of damage to aquatic systems by 
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scientists in Canada would form a partial basis for an emissions tax on U.S. 
coal fired power plants. Scientists from the U.S. would in turn estimate 
the cost of power plant pollution control to form a partial basis for an 
abatement fee for Canada. 
If the benefits of entering the foregoing agreement are strongly 
skewed to one nation (e.g., Canada) the issue linkage alternative provides 
some empirical direction. The U.S. is dependent on Canada for 85 percent 
of its potash consumption and analysis could focus on an optimal tariff on 
potash exports, i.e., where the marginal revenues from a proposed Canada 
tariff equal the marginal cost of U.S. emission control. Additional analy-
sis of the public choice links between electric power generation and potash 
conversion in agricultural production would also be required. 
Footnotes 
1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development, 
"Acid Rain," EPA- 600/79-036, 1980. 
2. Physical interdependence of production and/or consumption functions which 
is not fully priced or compensated. 
3. Where R = PB - c + d, the PB declines sharply and the c rises which 
reduces R. 
4. OECD Cooperative Technical Program to Measure the Long-Range Transport 
of Air Pollutants has developed computer models capable of estimating 
foreign contributions to each member country's sulfur deposition. 
5. For a thorough mathematical and graphical presentation of this ~oint, 
see OECD, pages 133-136. 
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